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At the Nexus between the National and the 
Global: The Discursive Construction of the 
Turkish Halal Market in the Neoliberal Age 
 
Introduction  
The global halal market is estimated to be worth $632 billion (USD) a year 
and is one the fastest growing markets in the world (Bergeaud-Blacker, 
Fischer, and Lever 2016). The certification of halal products and services 
has become a significant marketing practice in some non-Islamic countries 
(Fischer 2011), especially in the 1990s. However, until recently, certifying 
halal goods in a Muslim country such as Turkey has been considerably less 
common. During the 2000s, some private Turkish companies began to 
distribute halal certificates issued by international institutions based in 
Malaysia, Iran, and Indonesia. Turkish entities serving as agents of the 
certification institutes initiated halal certification as a business. To regulate 
this profitable market, a state regulatory institution, the Turkish Standards 
Institution (TSI) began to issue its own halal certificates in 2011. The Turkish 
Standards Institution claimed sole authority to award halal product 
certification to halal producers and shops. This state power-grab provoked 
heated controversy in the Turkish halal market. The conflict revolved around 
legitimacy and religiosity of halal certification institutions (HCIs). Since then, 
many private regulatory bodies have entered the halal market, resulting in 
fierce competition.  
This paper focuses on analyzing discourses of the official websites 
of three HCIs, The Food Auditing and Certification Research Association 
(GİMDES), Halal Food Auditing and Certification Center (HEDEM), and 
Health, Security and Halal Association (HELALDER), during the 
establishment of halal market as an emerging field in the time period of the 
rise of neoliberalism and political Islam in Turkey. Relying on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s definition of the field, this study strives to answer two research 
questions:  
R1: How do HCIs utilize different discursive strategies in order to 
differentiate from their rivals, to achieve legitimacy and recognition and to 
acquire power in the halal market field in Turkey? 
R2: How do Islamic actors (HCIs) contest to construct the field of 
halal market including its rules and knowledge in an economy in which 
logics of neoliberalism and Islam operate hand in hand? 
In this context, I identify three distinct strategies performed within the 
Turkish halal market: 1) claiming relative autonomy in an ambiguous 
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position between national and global market fields, 2) defining politics of 
halal-ness through promoting symbolic consumption and producing Islamic 
knowledge, and 3) disseminating Islamic education through new cultural 
intermediaries. Analyzing dominant discourses of the Islamic actors, their 
appropriation, contestations, and the ways they constitute these discursive 
practices help us to shed light on previously overlooked and understudied 
relational positions and discursive formations of the Turkish halal market as 
a new field.  
Recently, critical business studies scholars, anthropologists, and 
business administration researchers have studied the politics and 
economics of global halal markets (Ab Talib, Chic, Fischer 2017; Bergeaud-
Blacker 2016; Bergeaud-Blacker, Fischer and Lever 2016; Fischer 2009; 
Bergeaud-Blacker 2004). In the last decade, neoliberalism, rapid 
globalization, and information technologies have drastically changed the 
landscape of Islamic markets. Sandıkçı and Ger (2001: 146) state, “Today’s 
Islamic consumptionscape is characterized by pluralism and difference, and 
cannot be explained as either a rejection of consumerism, capitalism, or 
globalization or resistance to modernity.” Accordingly, the growing number 
of halal goods and services demonstrate how Muslims have increasingly 
become the object of global and national commercial interests. Bergeaud-
Blacker (2016) states that, particularly in Southeast Asia, halal markets are 
instruments for economic development in Muslim countries. Quite the 
opposite is true in some Muslim majority countries where everything is 
deemed to be halal. As Bergeaud-Blacker (2016) argues, the structural 
characteristics of the markets, the relationship between nation states and 
religion, the Islamic activism in different organizations, and the visibility of 
Islam in the public sphere play an important role in the plurality and 
complexity of halal markets in local and global economics. Despite its 
Muslim majority population, Turkey is one the countries in which concerns 
over halal standards and certification have emerged lately. Although some 
contemporary scholars discuss dependence between the fields of 
economics and religion in the Turkish halal market, these scholars 
exclusively focus on specific market divisions such as agriculture (Atalan-
Helicke 2015), meat and poultry (Lever and Anil 2016), tourism (Akyol and 
Kılınç 2014), Muslim consumers (Yener, 2015; Sandikci and Ger, 2007, 
2001), or local practices of transnational corporations (Izberk-Bilgin and 
Nakata 2016). Fewer of these studies examine the discursive formations of 
the halal market (Atalan-Helicke 2015; Izberk-Bilgin 2012). These 
researchers have made significant contributions to understanding the 
intersection of Islam and capitalist market economy. However, my own 
exploration contributes to the literature by applying Boudieusian perspective 
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to the local Turkish halal market in combination with the critical discourse 
analysis which will yield an understanding of this market as an emerging 
field. Drawing on the discursive strategies of HCIs, analysis of the Turkish 
halal market where HCIs and other actors (the state and businesses) strive 
to define the rules presents a field formed by the politics of contestation of 
multiple discourses. I employ critical discourse analysis to unravel power 
structures embedded in discourses by HCIs and meanings communicated 
through the language of new media. The theoretical framework of the field 
theory of Pierre Bourdieu is particularly useful in the context of the Turkish 
halal market because it facilitates analysis of “the positions of the field vis-
à-vis the field of power” and mapping of “the objective structures of relations 
between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete 
for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which this field is a site” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). Field theory locates social actors and 
the networks between them in a historically shaped field of power and 
competition (Swartz, 1997).  
In this study, first, I explore the theoretical framework: Bourdieu’s 
concept of field and field theory. Second, to fully develop the concept of the 
Turkish halal market as a field, I include in-depth examination of the socio-
political context of Turkish institutions and investigate significant nexus 
between Islam, secularism, and neoliberalism in Turkey. Before analyzing 
the organization of Islamic halal-certification bodies, I briefly discuss the rise 
of Islamic bourgeoisie in recent years in Turkey. Third, I explain the data 
collection and the method of the study. Fourth, I focus on specific discursive 
strategies of three prominent actors of the Turkish halal market. These 
strategies vary from claiming relative autonomy and marketization of 
symbolic products such as halal champagne and wine to debates on 
knowledge production and Islamic education. In the final section, regarding 
halal market as a symbolic mode of communication, I conclude that Turkish 
halal certification actors are simultaneously adapting, appropriating, and 
contesting Islamic discourses for justification of their existence and 
acquiring power in the formation and transformation of the emerging field of 
the Turkish halal market in the global neoliberal economy.  
Theoretical Framework: Field Theory  
According to Bourdieu (1983; 2005), practices occur in structured arenas of 
conflict called fields. In other words, fields mediate the relationship between 
social structure and cultural practices (Swartz, 1997: 9). Bourdieu defines a 
field as “a network or configuration of objective relations between [social] 
positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99). Field, or the social space 
(Bourdieu, 2005) in which configurations and interactions happen, is a 
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significant aspect of Bourdieu’s work, and a useful operational concept in 
research. An analysis of social space not only locates the object of 
investigation in its specific historical and local, national, international, and 
relational context, but it also interrogates the ways in which previous 
knowledge about the object under investigation have been generated, by 
whom, and whose interests were served by those knowledge-generation 
practices.  
Üstüner and Thompson (2012: 799) state that “accordingly, the logic 
of field analysis has been applied to many different levels of social 
aggregation, ranging from macro-level systems of sociocultural practice 
(e.g., the economic field, the field of cultural production, the field of 
consumption); specific organizational domains (e.g., the journalistic field, 
the academic field, the nursing field, and the field of medical education); 
and still more contextually circumscribed institutional spaces such as the 
field of the [i.e] museum.” In this study, I conceptualize the “field” of halal 
market as a semi-autonomous mezzolevel organizational sphere in which 
social interactions, events, economic transactions, individual actions, 
discursive power struggles, and competition for recognition occur. The halal 
market simultaneously occupies multiple social fields including the 
economic field, the field of religion, the bureaucratic and political fields, and 
the cultural field. Thomson (2014: 70) claims that “Bourdieu posited a social 
world (the field of power) made up of multiple fields: large fields could be 
divided into subfields (e.g. art into literature, painting and photography).” 
She adds that “to complicate things further, Bourdieu suggested that the 
institutions within fields also operated as subfields, and his analysis of the 
housing market exemplifies both an analysis of the field, and the subfields 
of specific housing firms” (Thomson, 2014: 71). In a similar vein, by taking 
Bourdieu’s field approach into account, I explore HCIs as a subfield within 
the field of halal market. 
Field theory is concerned with the relationship between macro-
structures of power and organizational and professional practices of the 
actors in the field. Bourdieu (2003) considers a field as a dynamic site of 
struggle among social actors. This struggle in the field are mainly connected 
to power and status. Metaphorically speaking, Bourdieu suggests that his 
notion of the field resembles a game. Similar to a game, every field 
establishes its own structure of relations, governs the field by its rules and 
regulations, creates respective positions of agents, and constitutes its 
valued forms of capital (Üstüner and Thompson, 2012: 799).  
Bourdieau's field perspective differs from sociological analysis of 
contemporaries that limits power to the control of resources. Bourdieu’s 
fields are “arenas of struggle not only for control over valued resources, but 
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also for legitimation” (Swartz, 1997:122-123). The strategies in the struggle 
for power are related to legitimation and recognition of one’s position in the 
given field. Swartz says, “Indeed, for Bourdieu power is not a separate 
domain of study but stands at the hearth of all social life. And the successful 
exercise of power requires legitimation” (Swartz, 1997: 6). Therefore, 
Bourdieu considers all field structures to be are “arenas of struggle for 
legitimation” (Swartz, 1997: 123) as well as “fields of knowledge” (Thomson, 
2014: 66).  
In this context, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of field proves well 
suited for analyzing the newly emerging Turkish halal market. The halal 
market emerges as a discursive field in which HCIs are located in inter-field 
dynamics of the fields of economics, religion, politics, and cultural 
production. Application of field theory reveals the contested and conflictual 
character of the halal market as an arena of struggle for legitimation and 
power in a religiously oriented market. Bourdieu’s sociological theory and 
his conceptualizations including the field are particularly significant to a 
fuller understanding of discursive practices of HCIs in a relational context 
and historical social space which highlights the relationships between the 
Islamic religion and the social structure of the market. To understand the 
Turkish halal market as an emerging field, first, I look at how the halal 
market operates in a neoliberal global order in the broader historical and 
socio-political context of Turkey.    
Contestations of Turkish Halal Market: Secular Modern 
Turkey, Islamic Bourgeoisie, and Neoliberalism in a growing 
Field 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the founding fathers of the modern Turkish 
Republic transformed Turkey by implementing rigorous westernizing reform 
policies. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led Turkish elites in a modernization project 
to transform Turkey from a multi-religious and multi-ethnic Islamic state to 
a secular nation state. According to Navaro-Yashin (2002a), secularism has 
long defined the state in Turkey. Even today, secularism is one of the 
fundamental, yet the most controversial, pillars of the modern Republic. 
Some Islamist groups have represented themselves as anti-secular. These 
groups lead movements that inspire sentiments against Western lifestyle, 
traditions, and values. At the discursive level, the relationship of these 
Islamic groups with modernization and western commodity cultures has 
been perceived as critical (Navaro-Yashin, 2002b; Gülalp, 1997; Göle, 
1997).  
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Navaro-Yashin (2002b: 222) argues that “politics of culture between 
secularists and Islamists in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s developed in the 
context of a consumer market influenced by globalization. So central was 
consumerism to the social life of this period that political conflicts were 
organized, expressed, and mediated through this medium.” As noted by 
Navaro-Yashin (2002a; 2002b) and Nilüfer Göle (1997), in Turkey, the 
relationship between Islamists and Western modernity is a crucial, yet deep 
and complicated one. Commodification and social practices of modernity 
have infiltrated Islamic communities and left their mark on both Islamic and 
secular communities (Sandıkçı and Ger, 2001; 2007).  
This relationship has become even more complicated with Turkey’s 
shift to neoliberalism and its engagement with rapid globalization through 
transnational networks. Until 1978, the Turkish economy was characterized 
by an import-substitution regime and the state was the key player for the 
regulation, the development, and the growth of the economy (Öniş, 1998). 
According to Öniş, in the 1980s, “a profound shift in philosophy occurred in 
Turkey concerning the role of the state in economic affairs. The new 
economic strategy aimed at decreasing both the scale of public sector 
activity as well as the degree of state intervention in the operation of the 
market” (1998: 183) through liberalization and extensive privatization. 
However, this does not rule out “the complexity of Turkey’s recent political 
economy [which] relates to the apparently contradictory trends involving 
centralization and decentralization simultaneously” (Öniş, 1998: 189).  
After the 1980s, conservative Islamic businesses and religious sects, 
previously excluded from and marginalized in economic landscape, were 
incorporated into the Turkish national economy (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012; Öniş, 
1998). The neoliberal incentives of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi 
(AKP) (Justice and Development Party) eased the way for the rise of an 
Islamic bourgeoisie in provincial towns and cities of rural Anatolia as well as 
in cosmopolitan centers of Turkey (Atalan-Helicke, 2015; Sandıkçı and Ger, 
2007). Izberk-Bilgin (2012: 44) argues, “the prominently secular façade of 
the Turkish marketplace significantly changed with the proliferation of faith-
based offering such as Islamic media, movies, music, novels, toys, 
swimsuits, resorts, beauty shops, and cafes in the 1990s.” In the 2000s, 
according to Sandıkçı and Ger (2007: 189, 210), for the neo-Islamic 
bourgeoisie becoming modern is the utmost concern since the modern 
identity signifies the integration with the global world. Together the neo-
Islamic middle class and Islamic businesses fostered by AKP policies 
support and aid the halal market movement. As I discuss in the next section, 
during the 2000s, Turkey has taken a shifting position in relation to Islam by 
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attempting to represent both the global and the local geopolitical power 
configurations. 
 
Turkey: Centralization of Authority, Decentralization of the 
Halal Market 
Since AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey has strived to become a global 
player in the economy and the world politics. In the early period of AKP rule, 
the Islamic government has concentrated on improving political, economic, 
and cultural relationships with neighboring countries in the Middle East as 
well as with the Islamic states to hold a prominent position in the Muslim 
world (Kaptan and Karanfil 2013). This vision shaped country’s foreign 
politics and fulfilled in the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambitious 
actions and statements until recently. For example, Turkey hosted the 
recent Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in April 2016. 
Erdoğan has been elected as the current chief of the organization (OIC). 
Erdoğan’s ambition to be a global leader of the Muslim world has resurfaced 
in many populist occasions including condemning Myanmar’s attitude 
towards Muslim minorities (Rohingyas), supporting Syrian opposition 
against Assad’s regime, criticizing Sisi’s coup d’etat in Egypt at the 69th 
United Nation General Assembly after the fall of the Islamist Morsi 
Government, and clashing with Israeli president Shimon Peres over 
Palestinian issues and Gaza in a World Economic Forum debate in Davos.  
Surprisingly, Turkey has not claimed any leadership in the global 
halal market and has not entered into a fierce competition with other Muslim 
countries to regulate the world halal trade while the country strives to take 
a prominent role in the Muslim world. In correspondence with its neoliberal 
economic strategies, the AKP government hangs onto the idea of retreating 
states particularly in the Turkish halal market. Unlike in Malaysia and 
Singapore (Fischer 2011), the Turkish state has neither introduced nor 
strictly enforced standardization in the halal market. The state has become 
one of the economic actors among many in the Turkish halal market. In the 
global neoliberal logic of the economy, by abolishing its authority to regulate 
the faith-based market and avoiding to implement rules of standardization, 
the Turkish state paved the way for a market halal field run by the private 
companies. 
 
Methodology and Data Collection  
The field theory is concerned with “how meaning is produced relationally, 
both via the play of difference among symbols and among the social agents 
who produce them” (Benson, 1998: 486). According to Swartz field analysis 
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“directs the researcher’s attention to a level of analysis capable of revealing 
the integrating logic of competition between opposing viewpoints. It 
encourages the researcher to seek out sources of conflict in a given domain, 
relate that conflict to the broader areas of …power, and identify underlying 
shared assumptions by opposing parties” (1997: 126). In this regard, field 
theory scrutinizes the positions of the institutions, organizations, groups, 
and individuals within the societal power structure while taking particular 
historical development of a national culture into consideration. 
In this study, I utilize field theory as an epistemological approach 
rather than a methodological approach. Field theory provides us the 
structural locations of the agents within a specific field. Each agent claims 
a position in the field in relation to other agents regarding its autonomy and 
heterenomy. From a Bourdieusian perspective, field theory investigates 
power struggles shaped by different forms of discourses for the construction 
of social reality, which is constituted by an ongoing struggle over meaning. 
In addition, for Bourdieu, relational thinking is an important concept since 
subjects (persons or institutes) derive their social meaning from their 
positions with respect to one another in a social field (de Nooy, 2003: 305). 
Therefore, here, I take into consideration the discursive positionality of the 
HCIs not only regarding their discourse of autonomy and heteronomy, but 
also the shifting power dynamics between the global and national halal 
markets. In the field theory, both the position and power of each particular 
agent is determined by the specific rules of the field and interactions among 
the agents. David Swartz (2016) states that “the concept of field stands as 
an alternative analytical tool to institutions, organizations, markets, 
individuals, and groups, though all of these can be key components of fields. 
Field analysis brings these separate units into a broader perspective that 
stresses their relational properties rather than their intrinsic features and 
therefore the multiplicity of forces shaping the behavior of each.” Field 
analysis provides a broader perspective to indicate the halal market 
discourse as a structured totality created by relational positions of Islamic 
agents. However, methodologically, I will employ critical discourse analysis 
to explore the websites of HCIs. 
Canniford and Karababa (2013) emphasize the importance of 
discourse in the construction of a marketplace through ambiguous and 
malleable articulations and changing configurations of social actors in 
contemporary consumer cultures. The concept of halal, which has been 
defined “culturally and economically,” (Bergeaud-Blacker, Fischer and 
Lever, 2016) has also been determined through discursive formations with 
regard to power relations in local and global markets.      
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Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been developed as an 
interdisciplinary approach to study language and relations between 
discourse and power in different socio-cultural contexts. Methodologically, 
the discourse analysis is grounded in a rigorous and detailed linguistic 
analysis of texts (Phelan and Dahlberg, 2011: 9). However, similar to field 
analysis, CDA focuses on contested meanings of opposing parties or 
competitors in order to reveal the concealed logic of mechanisms of power. 
Both field analysis and CDA investigates naturalization processes of the 
dominant belief systems, and how actors and agents contribute to the 
maintenance of the power relations and social order. Particularly, through 
the analysis of linguistic structures, CDA can explain overt relations of 
struggle and conflict (Wodak, 2001: 2) in social structures. In a similar vein, 
Bourdieu theorizes “fields as antagonistic, as sites of struggles” (Thomson, 
2014: 78). In this research, field theory delivers a macro analysis for 
understanding the social reality constructed through discursive practices of 
the HCIs, whereas CDA provides a methodology that offers an elaborate 
linguistic analysis of the written texts—the websites of HCIs.  
Considering discourse as a form of social practice, this paper carries 
out a critical discourse analysis of websites of halal regulatory institutions 
by focusing on the ways in which language is in use. To identify the 
controversies and prominent topics of halal discussion, the data was 
collected between May 1, 2015 and January 30, 2016 from websites of 
three vanguards of Turkish halal sector: GİMDES, HELALDER and 
HEDEM. In a complex material of media, the study selectively draws data 
from their bi-monthly trade magazines, editorials, statements of mission and 
vision, and other founding documents to analyze discursive strategies of the 
HCIs in an emerging field. In order to find related media texts, I used search 
engines of these websites. Through their digital archives, I searched for 
related discourse strands regarding “halal,” “halalness,” and “haram” 
(unlawful). To define their strategies, I investigate the linguistic features 
including lexical choices, grammatical structures, cohesion, and semantics. 
All texts were read carefully to determine reiterating narrative patterns, 
repeated words, contested phrases, and recurrent content. I particularly 
selected articles and editorials which discusses the politics of definition of 
“halal” and “halalness” and those which deals exclusively with the field of 
power. A total of 43 media texts were selected in aforementioned websites. 
Among 43 texts, particularly 15 articles and editorials have been chosen for 
detailed linguistic analysis as representative of discourses about politics of 
defining halal. First, I specifically looked at the articles and editorials which 
could be associated with broader fields of religion, culture, and halal 
economy and stand at the intersection of these fields. I read all articles one-
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by-one and noted repeated ideas and concepts in order to create 
conceptual groups. Conceptual groups were divided into sub-categories 
based on common themes including autonomy-heteronomy; symbolism; 
knowledge production, and instruction. I took into account the categories 
appeared multiple times in the given time period by grouping them into three 
main categories: the discourse of (1) relative autonomy at the nexus 
between the national and the global market fields, (2) symbolic consumption 
and Islamic knowledge regarding the definition of halal and halal-ness, and 
(3) Islamic education provided by HCIs as new cultural intermediaries. 
Finally, all media materials were re-read to reorganize and to eliminate 
overlapping categories.  
 
The Emergence of Halal Market in Turkey  
The halal market, first, has emerged de facto without any official regulations 
by the state. Customarily, self-certifying companies, working with local 
clerics (imams), developed a self-motivated and self-driven halal industry 
particularly in the poultry and the meat sector (Lever and Anil 2016). 
However, “the greater rise of halal awareness in Turkey can be traced back 
to 2002 when the ruling AKP came to power and re-legitimized Islam” (Lever 
and Anil, 2016: 43). In the 2000s, the private halal certification institutions 
such as GİMDES, HEDEM, and HELALDER aggressively entered the 
market to regulate halal industry in Turkey.  
GİMDES, the first for-profit halal certification institution in Turkey, 
was established in Istanbul in 2005. According to Izberk-Bilgin, GİMDES is 
“a noteworthy example to the Islamist activists’ space-making for and 
discursive formation of a new market within a prominently secular 
marketplace with little halal consciousness” (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012: 46). It 
plays a vital role as it offers a wide range of training and educational 
programs, various international conferences, exhibitions, fairs and 
workshops that complement the ambitious strategies aimed at raising the 
public awareness of the principles and concepts of halal and the importance 
of halal certified products. The variety of accredited institutions with which 
GİMDES works in many continents including Australia, Europe, and Asia 
reflects the global nature and prevalence of halal business as well as 
company identity of GİMDES. In this study, among three institutions, 
GİMDES has received prominent attention due to its well-recognized 
market dominance (Atalan-Helicke 2015; Izberk-Bilgin 2012) in the Turkish 
halal economy. 
In 2010, two non-governmental institutions, HEDEM and 
HELALDER, emerge as rivals to GİMDES in order to regulate the national 
halal industry. HEDEM was founded in İstanbul to “provide awareness to 
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Muslim consumers in the fields of food, cosmetics, medical, and cleaning 
supplies (HEDEM Icerik 2015). In addition to its high level integration with 
the Western institutions, HEDEM works in cooperation with the international 
certification bodies in Latin American countries and East Asian institutions. 
Since its establishment, HEDEM has taken a different position in the halal 
market field. Unlike GİMDES, the regulatory body acts as a halal education 
academy for inspectors of halal market.  
Based in Konya, HELALDER was established with the aim of 
“facilitating the supply of halal food, carrying out studies on halal products, 
and providing certification for halal goods” (Helalder Kurumsal 2015). The 
certifying body mostly worked with local companies and collaborate with 
Baharu Corporation that specializes in importing and distributing various 
products in Japan. In addition to Turkey, they distribute certification for halal 
products mainly in Japan and Jordan. Although it came to halal movement 
as an early player, HELALDER remained relatively less competitive and 
more peripheral in the industry. Hence, my analyses mainly revolve around 
GİMDES and HEDEM. 
 
Discourse Analysis and Websites of the Turkish Halal Bodies 
 
The relative autonomy and the secular nation state  
Among all recent policies of AKP government, the Turkish halal certification 
bodies have most benefited from the deregulation of markets principle of 
neoliberalism, since deregulation offers new possibilities in business via 
multiplicity of discourses in the market. Under the pro-Islam and neoliberal 
AKP government, the changing definition of Islamic consumption through 
incorporation and negotiation with neoliberalism has become a significant 
strategy for Islamic halal-certification organizations. Their discursive 
strategies have been manifested on the discourse of the relative autonomy 
which challenges the authority of the nation state. Since the Turkish state 
restructures the halal market field by embracing decentralized tendencies, 
the autonomy of the halal market field and specifically relative autonomy of 
the HCIs become one of the dominant discourses in the field. The Turkish 
state has become one of the economic actors in the halal market field by 
giving up its major role as a regulatory institution which governs the Turkish 
halal industry. Thus, HCIs would be in a position to exploit halal market and 
would bypass state’s authority. Local institutions are able to form alliances 
with global actors of halal market and global halal regulatory bodies of 
different nation states other than their own. For instance, the life-long 
tension between secular modern state and Islamic agents has become 
evident in GİMDES’ identification of “halal” and in its effort for legitimacy of 
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their halal certification accredited by JAKIM of Malaysia. In an interview, the 
founder and the president of GİMDES, Hüseyin Kami Büyüközer states that 
“We are issuing [halal] certificates based on Malaysian [government’s] 
[halal] standards [because] a halal certification, issued by a secular 
government, is unacceptable. [Halal] standards of TSI [of the Turkish 
government] is originated 99% in the West. Such an institution cannot 
distinguish halal from haram (unlawful)” (Sabah 2011). In this statement, 
Büyüközer not only challenges the power of secular Turkish state and 
questions the religiosity of the state’s certification institution (TSI), but also 
legitimizes GİMDES’ existence as imperative. The authority and power of 
the modern state in the national economy has come under scrutiny when 
GİMDES searches for autonomy in a global scale against the nation state. 
In addition, by discursively aligning GİMDES with the heteronomous 
structures of transnational halal market field, Büyüközer creates an image 
for GİMDES in the field of power in the halal market. By implicitly stating the 
relative autonomy of his institution, he highlights GİMDES’ ability to work 
with another Islamic nation state and with a transnational halal regulatory 
body more efficiently than the national institutions.  
 The struggle for legitimacy and the institutional authority is more 
striking in terms of antagonisms between GİMDES and TSI when 
Büyüközer uses a subversive discourse and rejects the legitimacy of TSI’s 
certification of halal. He harshly criticizes the religiosity of the modern 
secular state for competing in the halal market field. Rather, he emphasizes 
the legitimacy of the Islamic transnational regulatory bodies that are known 
for their heteronomy. Büyüközer implies for the need for an Islamic 
autonomous halal market that exceeds the nation state’s authority.   
 
Symbolic consumption and Islamic knowledge: Case of halal wine and 
champagne  
Creating an Islamic market field concerns the circulation of Islamic 
knowledge about products and practices and of what is Islamic and what is 
not. In a context wherein Islamic knowledge is considered a primary and 
superior form of knowledge, greater leverage and power are gained by 
institutions of certification. Nevertheless, the discourses of certification 
institutions have brought about increased complexity and multiplicity of 
contested Islamic knowledge and symbolic consumption. For some Muslim 
consumers, halal wine and champagne have become an economically and 
culturally relevant and religiously appropriate product within the field of 
economy while others strongly reject and resist to these products and the 
marketing idea in the field of religion. Therefore, the discourse of the 
certification bodies about the diverse nature of the halal concept regarding 
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the issue of non-alcoholic halal drinks, such as halal wine and champagne 
has become a discursive battle field for defining halal.  
As part of their marketing strategy, some halal-certification bodies 
provide certifications for companies that enter new markets with Muslim 
consumers and compete in the global alcoholic beverage industry. Mostly, 
non-alcoholic wines contain 0.2-0.5% alcohol. However, a European based 
company called Kevser Tabak claims that the company eliminated alcohol 
completely in its wine-making process (Ziauddin 2013). Taner Tabak, a 
Turkish–Dutch businessman who produces halal champagne and wine 
under the brand name Kevser explains how the idea of halal wine was born: 
“In a reception for businessmen living in the Netherlands, a Muslim 
businessman complained about non-alcoholic beverages and asked why 
there were no alternative for Muslims who cannot consume alcohol. 
Referring to the wine being served, he said, ‘I wish there were halal versions 
of this, then we would drink it’” (Milliyet 2015). In this statement, Tabak 
implies that an affluent Muslim who has a right and an opportunity to attend 
upscale receptions also has a right to consume halal wine. By the same 
reasoning, any Muslim, not just the wealthy ones, should not be deprived of 
consuming a highly symbolic and hedonic product. Wine is a significant 
product due to its religious connotations in Christianity and is a symbolic 
marker of social class (Bourdieu 1989). Tabak claims that there is high 
demand for their products, especially for halal champagne in Turkey, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. Kevser is certified by HQC (Halal Quality 
Control) agency, based in the Netherlands.  
Although some certification institutions promote halal wine and 
champagne, other organizations, like GİMDES, accuse such companies of 
“being ungracious” and use unrestrained, emotive, and very direct language 
on their websites, as evidenced in an article in GİMDES’s website: 
“Inglorious [people] are on duty: Halal Champagne! … Since Christmas is 
approaching, to influence [literal translation: to “infect”] Muslims with their 
disgusting lives, [infidels] are trying to implement various plans of the devil 
…. These infidels (kefereler) never give up cooperating with the devil to 
make Muslims sinners” (Gimdes 2015e). GİMDES claims that the institution 
that certified Halal champagne has not been recognized internationally in 
the halal market. However, as discussed above, in case of GİMDES, 
Büyüközer underlines global collaborations of his company with global halal 
regulatory bodies such as JAKIM of Malaysia. The contradiction in 
Büyüközer’s statement exemplifies the power struggles in the halal market 
field which attempts to provide legitimacy to GİMDES over other halal 
certification bodies. GİMDES president Büyüközer gives his views on halal 
non-alcoholic drinks, stating that “this is devilishly cunning.”  For Büyüközer, 
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these are tricks of non-Muslims to deceive believers and lure them to 
drinking non-alcoholic wine that will later spiral into consumption of the 
alcoholic version (GIMDES 2015a). Here, his discourse is connected with 
the symbolic significance of halal drinks. Halal wine and champagne acquire 
a sign commodity status in the symbolic network of halal goods by providing 
alternatives for Muslim consumers. In a global economy marked by non-
Islamic practices, GİMDES challenges not the modes of symbolic 
consumption but the dominance of haram products and ingredients in 
goods. In the process of commodification, providing halal wine and 
champagne in line with Islamic rules has no utility value, but represents a 
symbolic referent for differentiating and branding an identity for the Islamic 
consumption culture. The halal products posit a discussion wrapped around 
symbolic referents of culture and religion. Producing halal wine and 
champagne is a symbolic attempt, as well as a profit driven effort, which 
offers a lifestyle experience to Muslims faced with an enormous range and 
diversity of alcoholic products. Halal wine or champagne, which has a 
symbolic meaning and a religious connotation, has become an object of 
prestige for Muslims who have adopted the consumption patterns of modern 
and secular Western lifestyles. Therefore, the paradox arises the 
juxtaposition of opposing elements through a discussion of seemingly 
contradictory products, such as halal champagne and wine.  
In a similar debate, halal-certification institutions discuss the use of 
alcohol not only in drinks but also in mundane products that Muslims 
consume. However, this also becomes a controversial issue among HCIs, 
which exhibit varying attitudes to rules governing Muslim life. HCIs do not 
provide a uniform approach to Muslims. In particular, GİMDES raises 
concerns about alcohol in medicine and cosmetic products. In its websites, 
GİMDES declares the following statement: “Many hospitals and pharmacies 
provide cough syrups that contain about 60 mg of alcohol and even mention 
this fact on their bottles. Will the Muslim use this syrup? Do they not have a 
right to ask for cough syrup without alcohol?” (GIMDES 2015b). 
Despite the objection of GİMDES, both HEDEM and HELALDER 
defend Muslims’ right to consume alcohol in health and cosmetic products 
for daily use. Here, HEDEM and HELALDER give an example of the power 
struggle to produce legitimate knowledge about the knowledge of religion 
and halal lifestyle. As opposed to emotionally reactive approach of 
GİMDES, HEDEM (Helal Denetim 2015) takes a didactic position and states 
that:  
In case of treatment, there are two different approaches to 
halal. Based on the Prophet’s saying, ‘God has not declared 
your remedy in haram’ (Allah şifanızı, size haram kıldığı 
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şeylerde kılmadı)’ (Buhari, K.el-Eşribe: 15), any medication or 
drug considered haram is forbidden. Another approach claims 
that although the Prophet Mohammed forbade men to wear 
silk, he gave permission for some of his companions to wear 
it if they suffered from a skin disease (Buhari el-Libas, 29;K. 
El-cihat,91). By the same reasoning, if there is no halal 
medication for a specific treatment, haram drugs are 
considered licit [including those containing alcohol]. 
  
On the contrary, HELALDER enters the debate with a bold statement: any 
alcoholic drink is strictly forbidden and is explicitly haram. However, in the 
cosmetics industry, use of alcohol is permitted within the limits of the 
Ministry of Health (Alkol Konusunda Fetva 2015). In contested debates 
about halal wine, champagne, and mundane products that contain alcohol, 
the conflicting and contradictory discourses of halal bodies have made the 
definition of “halal” even more ambiguous. As a result, the conceptualization 
of halal has become more open to question. The multiplicity of dispersed 
and disconnected definitions has brought about a lack of coherence and 
diverse approaches to halal. However, this approach has also provided an 
opportunity for halal-certification bodies to develop and flourish in an 
ambiguously defined and vaguely structured market to legitimize their 
existence and to facilitate their power to generate knowledge of an 
emerging field. 
 Consequently, given the complex nature of the halal concept, these 
bodies make claims regarding the greater validity of their own certificate in 
comparison with others. The symbolic boundaries of what is halal and what 
is haram are not determined solely based on religious scripts, the Koran, 
traditional norms, or normative conventions. Therefore, the HCIs negotiate, 
reappropriate, and adapt these boundaries and coordinate the social 
interactions among competitors. In the field of halal market, knowledge of 
halal is negotiated and disputed to create a criteria of legitimacy of Islamic 
actors through antagonistic discursive struggles. The legitimization for the 
existence of HCIs depends routine confirmation of this legitimacy and 
socioeconomic hierarchy on a regular basis. In the next section, I show how 
discussions among organizations indicate these institutions’ approaches to 
education as well as their struggles in the field for the legitimacy and power. 
 
The new cultural intermediaries, and educating Muslims 
Bourdieu (1984) describe “new cultural intermediaries” as groups of 
workers involved in the provision of symbolic goods and services. According 
to Bourdieu (1984), the main purpose of new cultural intermediaries is 
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production, dissemination, and marketing of symbolic goods. In the Turkish 
halal market, Islamic certification institutions strive to play a leading role as 
“new cultural intermediaries” whose mission is to educate the Muslim 
publics on halal consumption and Islamic lifestyle. Training Muslims about 
halal consumption is one of the strategies of HCIs to perpetuate and 
advance their position among halal regulatory bodies. Benson (1998) states 
that in field theory, changes in the structure of fields are produced from two 
basic sources. Since “to exist in a field is ‘to differ,’ a ‘dialectic of distinction’ 
ensures the constant production of change as new actors attempt to enter 
and make their mark in the field” (Benson, 1998: 487). HEDEM particularly 
positions itself as a pedagogical intermediary and strives to construct a 
distinct identity in the halal marketplace. On its website, the President of 
HEDEM, Selahaddin Alıç, emphasizes that education and the 
dissemination of Islamic knowledge are among the main objectives of 
HEDEM. By embracing education in a broader sense, he says “reading and 
learning are swimming against the tide of ignorance” (Alıç 2016). In doing 
so, HEDEM strives to occupy a dominant position and to carry out a 
controlling ethos in the field of Islamic education. It searches for prestige 
and recognition in the halal market field by positioning itself as an 
educational cultural intermediary. 
The founders of HEDEM also differentiate their institution by defining 
the identity of the founders as “the educated intellectual scholars of this 
country [Turkey].” Later, they explain their identities in detail: “We 
established this association because of our devotion to serving others as 
the elite and respected academics, literates, doctors, veterinarians, 
agronomists, chemists, engineers, and economists.” The words 
“academics” and “literate and educated” were repeated in the text, 
capitalized, and colored red (Helal Denetim 2016). In doing so, HEDEM 
aims to create reconciliation and a balance between religious knowledge 
and scientific/intellectual knowledge. The discourse of HEDEM 
simultaneously represents a contested approach to education. In this 
respect, HEDEM and its stakeholders claim an ambiguous position, both as 
religious scholars and scientific intellectuals. By claiming scientific authority, 
as well as a possession of Islamic knowledge, HEDEM continues to 
instrumentalize the scientific and empirical approach originates not only 
from diverse discourses among halal-certification associations, but also 
from the inconsistency in the institution’s expressions regarding education.  
The function and mission of the halal-certification institutions range 
from the general education of uneducated masses, to the convergence of 
specific knowledge (about hygiene etc.) to the public. GİMDES explains its 
mission in terms of creating and organizing “Muslim consumers” and 
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educate them about the products that they would consume (Halal 
Certification Turkey 2015). From this perspective, GİMDES situated 
education as a precondition of halal consumption. Educated and well-
informed Muslims identify and consume relevant halal products and 
services offered by Islamic cultural intermediaries. By employing 
pedagogical tools such as workshops, conferences, training programs, 
GİMDES strives to play a significant role in educating the public not only in 
Turkey but also worldwide. On their English website, GİMDES explains the 
aim of their pedagogy: “GİMDES, the leading Halal-certifying body in Turkey 
is organizing exhibitions and conferences every year to increase the public 
awareness of Halal Certified products. We are proudly announcing that this 
year we are organizing the international halal and tayyib workshops which 
will be held in Istanbul” (GIMDES 2015c). Based on titles of the papers 
presented in panels, the workshops focus on different aspects of Islamic 
lifestyle, including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, halal tourism, and new 
updates in animal slaughter and stunning. GİMDES claims to contribute to 
the religious preservation of individuals and society as a whole (GIMDES 
2015d). Here, GİMDES not only offers Muslims a practical training on halal 
and haram, but also competes with its rivals to generate and disseminate 
Islamic instructions which provide leverage to the company in the power 
play of the halal market field.  
 
Conclusion  
Until recently, the halal market which is supposed to be an Islamic practice 
was deemed unnecessary in many Islamic countries including Turkey. In 
this study, by focusing on the Turkish halal regulatory bodies GİMDES, 
HELALDER, and HEDEM I scrutinized discursive strategies of HCIs and 
investigated how HCIs negotiate legitimacy and power in the field of halal 
market and how the consecutive conflicts over contestation of discourses 
are undertaken in this field. I specifically discuss three main discursive 
strategies employed by the Islamic actors: 1) claiming a relative autonomy 
based on the ambiguous position of HCIs between the national and the 
global market fields, 2) defining politics of halal-ness through symbolic 
consumption and production of Islamic knowledge, and 3) disseminating 
Islamic education as a liability of the new cultural intermediaries. I argued 
that Islamic actors are adapting, appropriating, and contesting marketing 
discourses for justification of their existence and acquiring power and 
legitimacy in a newly emerging, yet globally defined, national market field.  
As a site of conflict and struggle, the halal market field emerges as a 
result of the coexistence of conflictual discourses. First, in order to 
monopolize power and legitimize its existence in the new field, every single 
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institution attempts to universalize a particular interpretation of halal in Islam 
and strives to eliminate multiple and complex interpretations of other 
institutions. Each regulatory body mercilessly competes with other Islamic 
actors in the national halal market, but cooperate with transnational 
regulatory institutions. As a discursive strategy, aligning national halal 
regulatory bodies with the global certification companies and positioning 
HCIs as relatively autonomous institutions at the nexus between the 
national and global fields play a pivotal role to achieve legitimacy and to 
seize power in the halal market. In this context, the decentralization 
tendency of neoliberal policies of the Turkish government, has created new 
opportunities for the relative autonomy and multiplicity of discourses of the 
Islamic HCIs. The expeditiously growing Turkish halal market institutions 
have successfully aligned themselves with the neoliberal norms at the 
expense of religious ideology. HCIs have reconfigured and calibrated 
religiosity to the extent that it has become commensurable with the tenets 
of neoliberalism. Second, in such a milieu, the halal market emerges as a 
field with an increasingly complex role of symbolic goods such as halal wine 
and champagne, and contested debates around the politics of the definition 
of halal. At the intersection of multiple fields including economy, politics, 
religion, and socio-cultural fields, HCIs deviate halal market from other 
markets by positioning this field as a unique domain of Islamic knowledge 
production and symbolic consumption. Finally, the HCIs contest to position 
themselves as the new cultural intermediaries of the field. In doing so, they 
facilitate the orientation of HCIs in a global neoliberal market and 
communicate to inform Muslims about their authority in the field of halal 
market. Educating Muslims and creating halal demand is a pedagogical 
function of these organizations, which aim to create a new generation of 
Muslim consumers through marketing, thereby satisfying the needs of an 
expanding Islamic market as well as providing legitimacy for the rival 
institutions. 
The emergence of halal market in Turkey is shaped and modified by 
country’s historical and socio-economic circumstances. Even today, despite 
its large-scale development in the 2000s and the dominance of political 
Islam in the fields of economy and politics, the Turkish halal market still 
remains marginal within the national economy. Among a number of complex 
economic and cultural factors, one reason is that the early Republican 
regime established the national economy based on secular ideology 
managed by state-run enterprises alongside private companies between 
the 1930s and 1980s. Previously, halal certification was not the main 
concern of state or private business initiatives. During the 2000s, halal 
regulatory bodies for-profit began to emerge one after another. The halal 
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market is not driven by the Turkish state’s aggressive bureaucratization and 
strict regulations. Embracing the dominant neoliberal discourse of limited 
state intervention, the AKP government endorses decentralization and 
promotes the relative absence of the state in the halal market. Since fields 
are “relational configurations where change in one position shifts the 
boundaries among all other positions” (Swartz, 1997: 124), the lack of state 
intervention into the halal market change the rules and landscape of the 
Turkish halal market field by providing an ambiguous position and relative 
autonomy to the HCIs. For instance, HCIs have emerged in a field in which 
the Turkish state provides a significant extension of powers granted to HCIs 
by loosely regulating the halal market in Turkey. The AKP government, in 
parallel to its neoliberal tenets, constraint its capacity to implement a long-
term centralized program for the adjustment of the halal market. By 
promoting decentralization and private companies, the Turkish state 
facilitated the power struggles among HCIs. However, the lack of state 
support for a newly emerging market came with a price. Due to 
underdeveloped nature of the Turkish halal market, the Islamic actors have 
little prospect of achieving international competitiveness and success. The 
power struggle for making and controlling of a new field operates in the 
national level. As a result, HCIs utilize diverse discursive strategies to 
flourish, to occupy a power position, and to legitimize their existence in the 
halal market field. The ambivalent structure of the Turkish halal market, 
shaped by the lenient state regulations including the deregulation principal 
of neoliberal ideology, has foregrounded private HCIs by providing them 
privileges to occupy a power position. The Turkish halal market has been 
formed and characterized by the contesting discursive formations within 
these power struggles which create a compelling, yet a contradictory 
emergent field.
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